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Shut Up and Fish: The Role of Communication  




Schott et al. (2007) have shown that the “tragedy of the commons” can be overcome 
when  individuals  share  their  output  equally  in  groups  of  optimal  size  and  there  is  no 
communication. The assignment of individuals to groups as either strangers or partners does 
not significantly affect this outcome. In this paper we investigate whether communication 
changes  these  results.  Communication  reduces  shirking,  increases  aggregate  effort  and 
reduces aggregate rents, but only when communication groups and output-sharing groups 
are linked. The effect is stronger for fixed groups (the partners treatment) than for randomly 
reassigned groups (the strangers treatment). Performance is not distinguishable from the no-
communication  treatments  when  communication  is  permitted  but  subjects  share  output 
within groups different from the groups within which they communicate. Communication 
also tends to enhance the negative effect of the partnered group assignment on the equality 
of individual payoffs. We use detailed content analysis to evaluate the impact of various 
categories of communication messages on behaviour across treatments.  
 
 
Key  words:  Common  pool  resources,  communication,  coordination,  cooperation,  free-
riding, behaviour in teams, partners and strangers, experiments 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Economic  decisions  are  frequently  made  by  groups  of  individuals  who  are 
competing with other groups of individuals. These may be firms competing with other firms 
to sell a product in a market or to extract a resource from a common pool or they may be 
teams  of  workers  competing  with  other  teams  of  workers  within  a  firm.  Typically,  the 
success of a firm or a team is dependent upon the effort expended by the members of the 
firm or team. These environments are particularly interesting because of the interplay of 
conflicting  incentives  that  may  exist  within  and  between  groups.  The  conflict  between 
groups may lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. In a tournament all competitors 
exert  effort,  but  only  one  may  win  the  tournament  and  receive  the  reward.  The  effort 
expended  by  losing  competitors  goes  unrewarded.  When  extracting  resources  from  a 
common pool, such as a fishery, competitors impose congestion costs on one another. The 
effort expended will typically exceed the efficient level of effort necessary to generate the 
resulting extraction level. When the competitors are groups or teams of individuals, conflict 
among  group  or  team  members  may  result  in  shirking,  which  is  typically  a  problem 
associated with the voluntary provision of public goods. Several studies have explored the 
cooperative  and non-cooperative outcomes  in  games between  groups of individuals,  but 
only  a  very  limited  number  of  studies  have  explored  what  causes  cooperation  and 
coordination within and between groups.  
Previous experimental studies have shown that communication in the form of non-
binding cheap talk improves cooperation in common-pool resource and public good games 
(Ostrom et al., 1994; Ledyard, 1995) and can overcome the “tragedy of the commons” or 
free-riding behavior in the provision of public goods. This implies that the decentralized 
governance of CPRs and public goods is possible as long as members of a single group are 
able to communicate with each other on a regular basis, and are not in conflict with other 
groups appropriating from the same CPR.  
A few studies have examined the effect of communication in inter-group public good 
games. Rapoport and Bornstein (1989), Schram and Sonnemans (1996) and Zhang (2009) 
study a step-level public good game played by two groups with the threshold determined by 
the contribution level of the opponent group. They report a significant increase in group  
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contributions when within-group communication is allowed. Sutter and Strassmaier (2009) 
evaluate  intergroup  and  between-group  conflict  with  and  without  communication  in  a 
tournament that involves two teams that compete for a fixed prize which the winning team 
members  share  equally.  They  find  that  free-riding  dominates  when  teams  either  cannot 
communicate or can only communicate with members from other teams. Communication 
within teams, on the other hand, enables teams to coordinate actions and overcome the free-
rider problem. The latter is in the interest of principals or employers but not in the collective 
interest of team members because they supply excessive levels of effort in order to win the 
prize. In a weakest-link tournament game, where the effective group effort is determined by 
the lowest effort expended by an individual in the group, Cason et al.,( 2009) report that 
within-group communication not only leads to greater coordination and more aggressive 
competition, but also reduces efficiency significantly. However, in these tournament designs 
there is no connection between the output teams produce and the effort they supply. A CPR 
environment, on the other hand, establishes a direct link between individual and group effort 
and total output when teams receive a share of output depending on their supply of effort 
relative to all other teams and the total effort supplied by all individuals. This connection to 
output  enables  one  to  derive  the  socially  optimal  allocation  of  effort  and  to  evaluate 
deviations from the optimal aggregate effort level.  
Intergroup conflict in CPRs without communication has been examined by Schott et 
al. (2007) and Heintzelman et al. (2009) for equal-sized output-sharing partnerships in a 
CPR environment. Output  sharing within partnerships  introduces a  free riding  incentive 
which  potentially  has  the  power  to  offset  the  excessive  effort  provided  by  CPR 
appropriators. Schott et al. (2007) examine strategic interactions both within and between 
groups in a laboratory setting where output sharing in partnerships is allowed. Partnership 
sizes  were  varied  between  single  resource  users  (no  output  sharing),  a  socially  optimal 
partnership size and a larger than optimal partnership size. They find that sharing output in 
partnerships significantly reduces effort devoted to appropriation from the common pool 
because the resource user’s tendency to provide excessive effort into extraction from the 
common pool (between-group conflict) is substantially offset by his or her tendency to free-
ride on the efforts of other group members (within-group conflict). They also find that when  
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the theoretically optimal group size is established, the groups allocate the optimal amount of 
effort in appropriating from the common pool. The latter is shown to be a socially optimal 
group  Nash  equilibrium  and  is  independent  of  random  (stranger)  or  fixed  (partner) 
assignment  to  groups.  Heintzelman  et  al.  (2009)  study  the  endogenous  formation  and 
stability of output-sharing groups and determine the conditions under which output sharing 
in optimal partnerships becomes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a two-stage game.  
Communication among members of a group is an important factor influencing the 
success of an output-sharing plan. Laboratory results for public goods environments with 
communication indicate that under-contribution, which characterizes environments with no 
communication,  disappears  when  communication  is  possible  (Isaac  and  Walker,  1988; 
Ledyard, 1995; Chan et al., 1999; Kinukawa et al., 2002). For the CPR environment, these 
results suggest that communication among group members may lead to coordination that 
offsets the free riding incentives provided by output sharing, thereby causing an inefficient 
increase  in  harvesting  effort.  The  impact  of  communication  on  effort  and  output  when 
communication is confined to subgroups of players, therefore, needs to be examined in more 
detail. Furthermore it is important to investigate how the effectiveness of output sharing in 
optimal-sized  partnerships  is  affected  when  there  are  different  ways  groups  can 
communicate  and  how  institutional  features  such  as  the  anonymity  and  rotation  of 
partnerships might impact the type of messages used by groups and its consequences for 
individual effort supply. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of communication on effort 
supply  in  different  output-sharing  partnership  environments  and  to  investigate  the 
relationship between the provision of effort and the type and volume of messages. A set of 
treatments were created to both investigate the effects of communication on output-sharing 
as  a  possible  CPR  management  instrument  and  to  investigate  how  various  forms  of 
communication interact with inter- and intra-group incentives. We design a CPR game with 
equal output-sharing in partnerships, which allows us to analyze within and between group 
conflicts  and  to  evaluate  deviations  from  the  socially  efficient  outcome.  We  derive 
hypotheses  based on theoretical  insights  and empirical  evidence from  past  experimental 
studies  for  a  variety  of  different  communication  group  and  CPR  output-sharing  group  
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arrangements. We then evaluate individual and group behaviour in a controlled laboratory 
experiment  with  online  communication  in  chat  rooms.  We  contrast  our  results  to  no-
communication treatments with partners and strangers and other related empirical results in 
the literature. Finally we analyze the frequency and content of messages in the different 
communication treatments and offer insight into how message content and frequency are 
related to differences in behaviour.  
The first environment we examine reflects the case of a number of communities, 
businesses or social groups that communicate among themselves, share output equally with 
members from their community or group, but compete for the yield from the CPR with other 
communities or groups. This setting takes the “partners” treatment presented in Schott et al. 
(2007) and allows output-sharing partners to communicate within their group every period. 
The  treatment  is  comparable  to  Sutter’s  and  Strassmair’s  (2009)  within-group 
communication  treatment  in  a  tournament  setting,  but  is  evaluated  here  with  respect  to 
individual, group and social efficiency criteria. A second scenario randomly assigns subjects 
to groups every period (a strangers treatment). Group members then share output equally 
and communicate with each other, but are randomly allocated to new groups within which 
members can then communicate at the start of each round. This scenario is relevant for 
centralized allocation to randomized output-sharing groups and would be applicable if the 
central  manager  announced  the  anonymous  identities  of  randomized  group  membership 
before  each  period  of  extraction  began.  It  also  allows  us  to  evaluate  intra-group 
communication in a one-shot stranger setting in which communication groups are linked to 
output-sharing groups, i.e. to further delineate the effects of group member assignment and 
communication within  groups  on effort levels.  This  experimental design explores  if the 
strong  cooperation  within  groups  and  the  high  effort  levels  observed  by  Sutter  and 
Strassmair (2009) sustain when groups are reassembled each period. Our third, and final, 
scenario is one in which groups always communicate with the same group members (as in 
many communities or teams) but share output randomly with others not necessarily from 
their community or team. This scenario, in which communication groups and output-sharing 
groups are not linked, is a potentially important middle ground if linked output-sharing 
groups are able to avoid free-riding on each other, and thereby circumvent the efficiency  
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enhancing attributes of output-sharing in partnerships without communication. Allowing for 
fixed  group  communication  alongside  anonymous  randomized  output-sharing  group 
formation might also be a useful mechanism for managers who realize that their teams are 
over-supplying effort and wish to avoid direct coordination but want to reduce effort across 
members of competing teams.  
    
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The common-pool resource environment implemented in this experiment requires 
participants to allocate a fixed amount of effort, e, between an activity which will provide a 
certain return per unit of effort, r, and an activity which will provide a return that depends 
upon the effort expended by all of the participants who are trying to obtain output from the 
common-pool resource. The total output and return (price is normalized to one) from the 
common-pool resource is given by: 
 
Y = 32.5 X - 0.09375 X
2              (1) 
 
where  Y  is  total  output  and  X  is  the  sum  of  the  effort  expended  by  all  attempting  to 
appropriate from the common-pool resource.  
We implement a design which includes four factors: production group assignment, 
communication, communication group assignment and linkage. The last two are relevant 
only when communication is present. We test three communication treatments: a fixed-
fixed-linked  (FFL)  specification  in  which  appropriators  are  assigned  to  output-sharing 
groups for the entire session and the group members are permitted to communicate prior to 
each decision round, a random-random-linked specification (RRL) in which appropriators 
are  randomly  assigned  to  new  output-sharing  groups  prior  to  each  decision  round  in  a 
session and the newly arranged group members are permitted to communicate prior to their 
effort decisions each period and a fixed-random-not-linked (FRNL) specification in which 
communication groups remain fixed but output sharing groups are scrambled every period 
and  no  longer  linked  to  the  communication  group.  We  compare  these  with  no-
communication treatments in which output-sharing groups are either fixed (F) or randomly  
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assigned each round (R)
1. We analyze harvesting effort, relative rents and dispersion of 
payoffs by treatment. We also code and analy ze the content of the chat messages, and 
evaluate how each type of message might influence individual effort. 
There are 12 participants in each session who a re assigned to three output-sharing 
groups of 4 participants each. This is the optimal group size for a common -pool resource 
environment  which  uses  output  sharing  as  a  management  instrument  given  the 
parameterization in Schott et al. (2007). For this group size the free-riding incentives created 
by output-sharing offset the inefficient over-harvesting incentives in the CPR so as to induce 
the socially optimal level of effort and output. Table 1 summarizes the five treatments in this 
experiment.  
Communication is introduced by way of a chat window that appears on the computer 
screens of the participants.
2 Prior to the first decision round, individuals are given four 
minutes to send messages to other members in their communication group.   No private 
messages  are  allowed.  After  the  four -minute communication  period, individuals  make 
private and anonymous decisions about the number of units of effort they will allocate to 
appropriation from the common pool.   The remaining units of effort are automatically  
allocated to the activity that yields a certain payout per unit of effort (i.e. acts as an 
opportunity cost of effort). Subjects then share their output from the common pool amongst 
all output-sharing group members and are given a summary providing their earnings for the 
period, the average earnings of others in their group and the average earnings of others 
outside of their group. Prior to the second and third decision rounds, individuals are given 
three minutes to communicate. Prior to the fourth round this is set at two minutes and from 
the  fifth  through  the  fifteenth  rounds,  communication  is  limited  to  one  minute.  
                                                 
1 Five  possible  combinations  of  our  treatments  are  not  tested  in  this  paper.  Linking  fixed  and  random 
production groups and communication groups is not possible (FRL and RFL) and the remaining three (RFNL, 
FFNL and RRNL) were judged to be implausible in the context of CPR management.  
2 Bochet et al. (2006) compare different forms of communication in public goods laboratory experiments and 
find little difference between the effects of face -to-face communication and verbal communication through a 
chat room.  
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Communication is non-binding. Individuals are not required to adhere to any agreement 
they may have reached during the communication period by way of the chat window.
3 
 
2.1. Treatments R and F 
In the conventional common-pool resource environment, each participant receives a 
share of the total output appropriated from the common -pool that is in proportion to the 
participant’s share of effort expended, xi /X , where xi is the output of individual i. In this 
treatment, the participant’s profit function depends upon individual effort, xi, the effort by 
all four members of the individual’s group, Xg, and the effort by all individuals using the 
common-pool resource, X. Output is distributed to output sharing groups in proportion to 
their group effort and this output is distributed equally to all group members. The individual 
profit function under output-sharing is, therefore, determined by  
 
πi = r(e – xi) + (1/4)(Xg/X)Y              (2) 
 
If r = 3.25 and e = 28, substituting equation (1) into (2) , differentiating πi with 
respect to xi and setting this equal to zero yields 
 
[(32.5 - 13)/0.09375] = X + Xg            (3) 
 
There is an equation like (3) for each member of each group. When the groups have 
more than one member, the equations for all of the members in any particular group are 
identical. Using m as a group identifier, for this case we have three unique equations of the 
form [(32.5 - 13)/0.09375] = X + 
mXg . 




3Xg. Solving these three equations for the three values of 
mXg we 
                                                 
3 Groups used up to 234 seconds, 178 seconds, 177 seconds and 118 seconds respectively in the first four 
periods and less than 60 seconds in the following periods. Thus there was no evidence that decisions were 
forced because of time pressure in our experiment.  
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find the group Nash equilibrium values 
mXg = [(32.5- 13)/0.09375]/[4] = 52 (a system effort 
of 156).
4 
Treatments R and F are differentiated in the manner by which participants are 
assigned to output-sharing groups. Although theory offers no prediction on the effect of 
group assignment, Schott et al. (2007) report that the dispersion of cumula tive earnings for 
the individual participants is significantly reduced in random group assignment compared to 
fixed group assignment. One possible explanation they provide is that individual players are 
more likely to manipulate others’ future choices in a fixed group assignment because they 
can best respond to other players accounting for the efforts from previous periods. These 
results might change when within-group communication is introduced. 
 
2.2. Treatments RRL, FFL and FRNL 
The parameters underlying treatments RRL, FFL and FRNL are identical to those for 
treatments R and F with the addition of non-binding communication by way of an electronic 
chat room among subgroups of the 12 participants in each session prior to the start of each 
decision  round.  Communication  typically  helps  individuals  in  groups  to  overcome  the 
tendency to shirk when payoffs can be characterized as the return to a public good, but it 
also helps them to reduce effort exerted in the extraction of the common pool in the absence 
of output sharing (Ostrom, et al., 1994, Chapters 7, 8; Muller and Vickers, 1996). When 
output sharing is used as a management instrument in a common-pool resource environment 
without  communication,  it  succeeds  because  individuals  shirk  on  others’  effort  to 
appropriate  on  behalf  of  the  group.  Introducing  communication  may  break  down  this 
shirking  behavior  as  members  of  the  group  have  the  means  to  attempt  to  collude  and 
compete against other groups to obtain a larger share of the system output. 
Profit  for  the  group  can  be  found  by  aggregating  equation  (2)  across  the  four 
members of the group. After substituting for Y from equation (1) this can be expressed as 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that there is not a unique equilibrium quantity for the individual. The equilibrium 
condition requires that the sum of the contributions of the individuals in a group equal a unique value. There is 
a unique group Nash equilibrium allocation of 52 units of effort to appropriation from the common pool from 
each group. This is the optimal effort to allocate to appropriation from the common pool (see Schott et al. 
(2007)). 
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πg = 3.25(28)4 - 3.25Xg + 32.5Xg - 0.09375X(Xg)        (4) 
 
Differentiating πg with respect to Xg and setting this equal to zero yields the first 
order  condition  for  group  payoff  maximization,  Xg  +  X  =  29.25/0.09375.  Using  the 
methodology described in section 2.1, and indexing the group contribution Xg as 
mXg we 
obtain 
mXg = 312/4 = 78 (a system effort of 234). This is the unique Nash equilibrium for 
each group when there are three four-person output-sharing groups who compete against 
each other for system output. There is no unique individual Nash equilibrium level of effort 
allocated to appropriation from the common pool. Note that when the output-sharing groups 
compete against each other as groups, aggregate system appropriation is predicted to rise 
from the optimal level of 156 to 234. 
 
3. EXPECTATIONS REGARDING EFFORT 
3.1. Treatments R and F 
  Given the parameterization of the common-pool resource environment introduced in 
section 3, the expectation is that with three four-person output-sharing groups each group 
will supply 52 units of effort for appropriation from the common pool. The system effort 
will be 156 units. This is the expectation for group and system effort for both treatments R 
and F.  
 
3.2. Treatments RRL, FFL and FRNL 
If communication groups and output-sharing groups are linked (treatment RRL and 
FFL), then it is possible that the effect of output sharing may diminish. This may occur if 
individual players act collusively and exchange information about the optimal level of effort 
in the one-shot version of the CPR game for which the group wants to maximize its share of 
system output. This suggests that within the context of treatment RRL and FFL, group effort 
will be greater than the optimal level of 52 units and may approach 78 units. However, it 
may take longer to reach 78 units for treatment RRL than if the output-sharing and linked 
communication  groups  had  fixed  membership  throughout  the  session,  because  group  
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members in the RRL treatment receive different feedback every round from new group 
members, and, therefore, will find it more difficult to form consistent expectations about the 
coordination of effort among group members. 
On the other hand, it will be difficult for individuals to coordinate on a specific 
group  strategy  when  communication  groups  and  output-sharing  groups  are  not  linked 
(treatment  FRNL).  This  difficulty  arises  because  individuals  will  not  know  into  which 
output-sharing group their communication group members are placed. However, comparing 
the FRNL treatment with the F or R treatments, participants may be better able to deduce 
and  agree  on  achieving  the  symmetric  Nash  equilibrium  outcome  in  which  everyone 
allocates the optimal level of 13 units of effort to appropriation to maximize the system 
output, which would achieve the most efficient and equitable solution. This is not a unique 
Nash  equilibrium  allocation  for  the  individuals,  but  the  focus  on  the  symmetric  Nash 
equilibrium is reasonable given that communication groups are not linked to output-sharing 
groups. Treatment  FRNL may be more likely to induce shirking compared to the other 
communication treatments because participants will have a weaker incentive to focus on 
group output maximization than on system output maximization. 
The following expectations result from the discussion above: 
  Expectation  1:  Effort  allocated  to  appropriation  from  the  common  pool  will  not 
differ between treatments R and F. 
  Expectation  2:  Effort  allocated  to  appropriation  from  the  common  pool  will  be 
greater in treatment FFL than in treatment RRL during early periods of a session. 
  Expectation  3:  Effort  allocated  to  appropriation  from  the  common  pool  under 
treatment RRL will tend to converge over time towards that from treatment FFL. 
  Expectation 4: Effort allocated to appropriation from the common pool will be less 
in treatment FRNL than in treatments RRL and FFL. 
 
4. RESULTS 
A total of 240 subjects participated in our experiment. There were four sessions in 
each of the five treatments. In each session, three groups of four subjects participated in 15 
decision  rounds  after  three  practice  rounds.  Laboratory  currency  was  converted  at  the  
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exchange rate of 200 Lab dollars for 1 Canadian dollar 1. On average, subjects earned $25 
each (the standard deviation was $2 and earnings ranged from $17.70 to $30.30 including a 
$5  show-up  fee).  Sessions  were  completed  within  60  minutes  in  treatments  without 
communication and within 90 minutes in treatments with communication. 
Table  2  summarizes  the  mean  system  effort  allocated  to  appropriation  from  the 
common pool. There is one observation in each session. Table 2 also provides numerical 
predictions based on the expectations discussion in section 3 above. A Kruskal-Wallis test 
indicates that there is a statistically significant difference among the 5 treatments (p-value = 
0.0073 for mean system effort).
5 
 
4.1. Aggregate effort 
For  treatments  F  and  R,  the  socially  optimal  Nash  equilibrium  with  players 
maximizing individual payoffs predicts the mean system effort of 156 units and mean 
individual session payoff of L$4217. The actual mean system efforts and mean individual 
session payoffs in both treatments are not significantly different from the predictions ( sign 
test, two-sided, n = 4, p-value = 0.625 for mean system effort in both treatments). There is 
also no significant difference between treatments F and R (Mann-Whitney U test, two-sided, 
p-value = 1.000, n = m = 4).  
In short, when there is no communication, the mean system appropriation effort and 
relative rents realized from the common pool are consistent with the equilibrium prediction 
of individual optimization. Group assignment (fixed versus random) makes no difference. 
These are identical to the results documented in Schott et al. (2007).
6 This evidence supports 
Expectation 1. 
                                                 
5 All non-parametric tests reported in this paper take each session as an independent observation. Test results 
from an OLS regression using robust standard errors are consistent with all non-parametric tests reported. The 
regression is of the form syseffort = a + bR + cFRNL + dRRL + eFFL, where the dependent variable is mean 
system effort per session, R, FRNL, RRL, FFL are treatment dummies, and “a” captures the value of the mean 
system effort in the F treatment. 
 
6 We have added an additional replication of F and R treatments for this paper which were not repor ted in 
Schott et al. (2007) in order to increase accuracy and provide symmetry to the three communication treatment 
sessions. Results from the new replications confirm the robustness of results reported by Schott et al. (2007).  
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When pre-play non-binding communication is allowed, system effort allocated to 
appropriation  differs  significantly  from  the  median  of  the  no-communication  treatments 
(Mann-Whitney U test, p-value = 0.0026, n = 8, m = 12). There is a significant increase in 
aggregate effort in treatment RRL relative to treatment R (Mann-Whitney U test, p-value = 
0.0433, n = m = 4) and an even larger significant increase in treatment FFL relative to 
treatment F (Mann-Whitney U test, p-value = 0.0209, n = m = 4). The null hypothesis that 
the mean system effort in FFL is equal to the predicted value of 234 units cannot be rejected 
(sign test, one-sided, p-value = 0.6250, n = 4). However, the null hypothesis that the mean 
system effort in RRL is equal to the predicted value of 234 can be rejected in favor of the 
alternative that it is less than 234 (sign test, one-sided, p-value = 0.0625). While the mean 
system effort in FFL is not different than 234 units, the mean system effort in RRL falls 
between the predicted value of 156 units with individual optimization (which is achieved in 
R) and the predicted value of 234 units with group optimization. 
Thus  our  expectation  that  communication  that  is  linked  to  output-sharing  leads 
individuals to reduce shirking in order to increase group payoffs can be supported by the 
data. This suggests that communication among group members counteracts the free-riding 
incentives  provided  by  output  sharing  and  leads  to  an  increase  in  appropriation  effort. 
Moreover,  the  offset  effect  is  much  larger  when  appropriators  are  communicating  and 
sharing output with the same group of participants each decision round than with a different 
group each decision round (comparing FFL with RRL, Mann-Whitney U test, p-value = 
0.0209, n = m = 4). Intuitively, it is more difficult for appropriators to enter into tacit or 
explicit agreement regarding appropriation when they are randomly assigned to groups in 
each  decision  round.  The  results,  however,  also  indicate  that  it  is  more  difficult  for 
appropriators to coordinate effort when they are communicating with the same group across 
all rounds of a session but sharing output with a different  group each round (treatment 
FRNL). Groups in the FRNL treatment thus performed as well as the no communication 
treatments, with effort not significantly different from the predicted individual-optimization 
level of 156 units (sign test, one-sided, p-value = 0.6250).
7 
                                                 
7 Appropriation effort in treatment FRNL is not significantly different from treatment R (Mann Whitney U 
test, p-value = 0.3865, n = m = 4) or treatment F (Mann Whitney U test, p-value = 0.1489, n = m = 4).  
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Result 1. When subjects are communicating with and sharing output with the same 
people each round, there is a significant increase in mean system effort in random output-
sharing groups (treatment RRL vs. R) and an even larger increase in fixed output-sharing 
groups (treatment FFL vs. F), where group effort is at the predicted group-optimization 
level. Compared to random linked group assignment (treatment RRL), fixed linked group 
assignment  (treatment  FFL)  leads  to  better  coordination  and  thus  significantly  more 
appropriation effort.  
Result 2. Group assignment has a significant impact on appropriation effort only 
when output-sharing and communication are linked. No significant difference is observed 
when communication groups and output-sharing groups are not linked, and the mean system 
effort is at the predicted individual-optimization level (treatment FRNL vs. R). 
Figure 1 reports the mean system effort across periods in each treatment. After the 
first decision round, effort in treatment FFL is higher than all the other treatments across 
rounds. This series shows a bit of a cycle that ends near to the predicted effort of 234 units. 
The  RRL  series  falls  between  the  FFL  and  FRNL  treatments.  The  difference  between 
treatment RRL and treatment FRNL is, however, not significant (Mann-Whitney U test, p-
value = 0.1489, n = m = 4). Ignoring the first decision round where subjects were getting 
acquainted with the rules of the game and the last decision round with potential end-game 
effects, none of the series display a convergence pattern. Thus the role of communication in 
improving  the  understanding  of  the  game  does  not  appear  to  be  crucial  in  any  of  the 
treatments other than FFL. This evidence supports Expectation 2 but refutes Expectation 3 
from section 3 above. In addition there is partial support for Expectation 4 since effort in the 
FRNL treatment was found to be significantly lower than FFL but not RRL. 
Result  3.  When  output-sharing  group  membership  changes  after  each  decision 
round, whether communication group is linked (treatment RRL) or not linked to the output-
sharing group (treatment FRNL) makes no significant difference to system effort. 
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4.2. Payoffs to participants in the CPR 
  The impact of output sharing on the returns to the participants is also important to 
evaluate  as  adverse  equity  considerations  or  reduced  incomes  are  likely  to  hinder  the 
approval of a regulatory mechanism even if it is economically efficient.  
With output sharing in groups of four, the average individual session payoff reaches 
a maximum at the socially efficient level (52 units of effort per group), which equals 4217 
lab dollars in our experiment.  
Table 3 reports the mean and coefficients of variation (CoV) of payoffs of individual 
session  payoffs.  An  OLS  regression  with  robust  standard  errors  indicates  significant 
differences  between  the  mean  CoV  of  payoffs  across  treatments.  The  smallest  CoV  of 
payoffs is observed in treatment FRNL while the biggest is in FFL (Table 4).
8 Pairwise 
comparisons of the mean CoV between treatments indicate significant differences between 
all paired treatments except treatments RRL and R. With linked communication groups the 
distribution of session payoffs for fixed output-sharing groups is less equitable than that of 
the random output-sharing groups, just as in the no-communication treatments. In addition, 
the payoffs for participants in the former treatments are less than those in the latter.  
However, when communication groups are fixed and output -sharing groups are randomly 
matched and no longer linked with communication groups (FRNL), payoffs are most 
equitably distributed among the five treatments and payoffs are significantly greater than 
those realized by participants in all other communication treatments .  This supports the 
conjecture in Schott et al. (2007) that random output -sharing groups would likely be more 
desirable than fixed output -sharing groups in an environment involving communication.  
Communication in social groups and random output -sharing outside of social ne tworks 
(FRNL)  might be the most desirable output -sharing environment.  Figure 2 displays the 
distributions of individual session payoffs across the five treatments. 
                                                 
8 The mean CoV in treatment FRNL is significantly different from treatment F, R, FFL and RRL (t test, p-
value = 0.0002, 0.0114, 0.0002 and 0.0001 respectively). There is significant difference between treatments F 
and R (t test, p-value = 0.0091) and also significant difference between treatments FFL and RRL (t test, p-
value = 0.0000). Treatment FFL is significantly different from treatment F (t test, p-value = 0.0000) while the 
difference  between  RRL  and  R  is  not  significant  (t  test,  p-value  =  0.1480). Treatment  R  is  significantly 
different from treatment FFL (t test, p-value = 0.0000) and treatment F is significantly different from treatment 
RRL (t test, p-value = 0.0402). 
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Nonparametric  tests  on  mean  individual  session  payoffs,  whose  distributions  are 
presented in Figure 2, indicate similar results. Taking one observation in each session, there 
is no significant difference in the mean individual session payoffs between treatments F and 
R (Mann-Whitney test, n = m = 4, p-value = 0.1489). When communication is allowed but 
communication groups are not linked with output-sharing groups (treatment FRNL), the 
mean individual session payoffs are neither significantly different from treatment F (Mann-
Whitney test, n = m = 4, p-value = 0.1489), nor from treatment R (Mann-Whitney test, n = 
m = 4, p-value = 0.5637). When the linkage between communication and output sharing is 
established (treatments FFL and RRL), the mean individual session payoffs are significantly 
different  from  corresponding  treatments  F  and  R,  as  well  as  treatment  FRNL  (Mann-
Whitney tests, for comparisons of treatments FFL and F, treatments RRL and R, treatments 
FFL and FRNL and treatments RRL and FRNL report identical results: n = m = 4, p-value = 
0.0209). The mean cumulative payoffs in FFL are significantly less than in RRL (t-test, p < 
0.01). 
 
5. CONTENT ANALYSIS AND EFFORT 
Our  results  indicate  that  communication  leads  to  a  reduction  of  within-group 
shirking  with  linked  output-sharing  groups.  This  results  in  greater  effort  to  appropriate 
resources from the CPR than when communication is not permitted. The next step is to 
explore further how communication in linked groups differs from non-linked groups, and to 
identify the impact that different communication messages have on effort levels. We apply a 
detailed content analysis to address these questions. 
 
5.1. Coding the messages 
Following Zhang (2009), we identified 14 categories of communication messages. 
Some  messages  sent  by  a  subject  may  fit  into  several  categories  so  categories  are  not 
assigned in a mutually exclusive fashion. The categories are listed in Table 5. Two coders, 
who were not involved in the analysis of the data from this experiment, independently coded 
all messages according to the 14 categories. A coded-message consists of the information 
submitted  by  a  participant  to  the  other  members  of  the  participant’s  group  during  one  
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communication sequence in a communication round preceding a decision round. A coded-
message sequence can be a single word or several sentences. It starts when the participant 
begins typing a message to be sent to the group and ends when the participant hits the 
“enter” button on the keyboard to submit the message to the group. A message is coded as a 
1 if it is deemed to fit into the relevant category of content and 0 otherwise. Each message 
can be coded under as many or few categories as the coders deem appropriate.  
Treatment RRL contains the most coded-message units (3218 units) as subjects were 
coordinating efforts with a new group every period. Treatment FRNL contains the least 
coded-message  units  (1808  units)  as  communication  with  people  outside  your  output-
sharing group is unlikely to affect harvesting efforts and so not as worthwhile pursuing.  
Table 5 summarizes the average frequency of coded-message units by two coders 
along  with  the  Cohen’s  Kappa  statistics.  The  Kappa  statistic  measures  the  degree  of 
agreement between two coders above that expected by chance. It has a maximum value of 1 
when agreement is  perfect,  0 when agreement  is  no better than by  chance  and it takes 
negative values when agreement is less than by chance. The general conventions regarding 
the interpretation of other values are: 0 < K ≤ 0.20 is poor agreement, 0.20 < K ≤ 0.40 is fair 
agreement, 0.40 < K ≤ 0.60 is moderate agreement, 0.60 < K ≤ 0.80 is good agreement and 
K > 0.80 is very good agreement (Neuendorf, 2005). 
All of the measured Kappa’s are significantly greater than 0, and so even the low 
levels of agreement between coders are greater than chance occurrences. Only three of the 
42 Kappa estimates indicate less than moderate agreement (Kappa < 0.40, with a conditional 
mean Kappa of 0.23).  This  is  true for category  codes  4, 9 and 10 in treatment  FRNL, 
occurring in categories for which messages are coded with very low frequencies (2.1%, 
1.83%, and 0.94% of messages sent, where the average across the remaining 11 categories 
in treatment FRNL is 10.48%). We have no conjecture for why these categories had such 
low  agreement  from  the  coders  (the  mean  Kappa  exceeds  0.55  for  these  same  three 
categories in both treatments RRL and FFL).   
The three most frequently coded categories are category 3 (propose an amount to 
invest in market 2), which represents 28% of all messages sent across treatments, category 5 
(agreement  with  other  group  members)  at  22%  and  category  7  (talk  about  investment  
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decisions or payoffs made in previous rounds) at 18%. Thus group discussions were focused 
on  proposing  and  expressing  agreement  to  particular  proposals  concerning  effort  levels. 
Category  2  (ask  for/inquire/clarify  proposals  of  other  group  members),  category  8  (talk 
about the conflict/competition/coordination), category 11 (talk about the game rules) and 
category 14 (other things that are irrelevant to decision making) are moderately common 
with  relative  frequencies  of  9.44%,  9.34%,  7.14%  and  7.83%  respectively.  Initiating 
discussion  (category  1),  mentioning  the  relationship  between  investment  decisions  and 
payments  (category 6),  speaking positively  about  the group (e.g., team work and group 
spirit, loyalty, honesty) and speaking negatively about the group (e.g., distrust, dishonesty, 
defection) each accounted for between 4% and 6% of the coded-message units. Surprisingly, 
discussions  within  groups  result  in  only  3%  of  the  coded-message  units  expressing 
disagreements or doubts (category 4). 
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of message types according to treatment. One can 
see from this that messages involving investment proposals dominate discussion within the 
RRL treatment, and that these kinds of messages are more frequent in RRL than the other 
two treatments. Again this supports the conjecture that linked communication and output-
sharing groups that are randomly reassigned each period would have the greatest incentive 
to communicate each period in order to foster cooperation and reduce shirking to maximize 
the group’s profit.  This  would require renegotiation and new effort  proposals  with  new 
group members each period. On the other hand, the only messages that are relatively more 
frequent  in  the  FFL  treatment  than  the  other  two  treatments  are  messages  concerning 
conflict,  competition  and coordination.  It  is  interesting to  see that linked output-sharing 
groups that are fixed over the length of the experiment spend less time making proposals 
each period and instead focus their discussion on strategies surrounding the inter- and intra-
group conflict inherent in the environment. Lastly, the only message category which was 
found to be relatively more frequent in the FRNL treatment related to messages discussing 
decisions or payoffs made in previous rounds. It is possible that subjects in this treatment 
found there was little incentive to communicate other than to discuss what happened in 
previous periods to each of the group members. 
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5.2. Correlations between chat messages and effort 
The relationship between the chat variables and individual effort within the group is 
probably bi-directional. That is, the number and content of chat messages may influence the 
level of group effort and also the level of group effort may influence the number and content 
of  messages.  To  avoid  this  issue  of  causality  we  first  examine  the  simple  correlations 
between individual effort per period and the total number of messages seen by the individual 
within  a  period  as  well  as  the  total  number  of  messages  in  each  category  seen  by  the 
individual each period. We adopt the Kendall Tau Rank Correlation coefficient, which is a 
non-parametric  measure  of  association  between  observations  on  two  variables.  This 
coefficient is computed by classifying every possible pair of observations as concordant 
(ranked the same on both variables) or discordant (ranked differently on the two different 
variables) and expressing the difference as a fraction of the total number of pairs. A value of 
1  implies  that  every  pair  of  observations  is  concordant,  -1  implies  that  ever  pair  is 
discordant, and 0 implies that half the observations are discordant and half concordant. 
We examine the treatments separately. The Kendall Tau correlation coefficients and 
the  p-values  associated  with  tests  that  the  correlation  coefficients  are  not  significantly 
different from zero are presented in Table 6. The simple fact of sending messages does not 
seem  to  have any significant  impact  on effort  in  any  treatment; however effort in  each 
treatment is correlated with specific types of messages. 
For  treatment  FFL,  individual  effort  is  significantly  negatively  correlated  with 
message categories 1, 2, 7, 10, 11 and 12 (messages focusing on clarification, previous 
rounds  and  negative  talk  about  the  group),  and  significantly  positively  correlated  to 
categories 9 and 14 (messages focusing on positive talk about the group and noting the last 
round). There are no other significant correlations. While correlations with most of these 
categories may be subject to reverse causation in fixed groups (i.e. previous effort affecting 
messages),  it  is  likely  that  messages  asking  group  members  to  clarify  their  proposals 
(category  2)  are  associated  with  poor  group  coordination  and  likely  the  cause  of 
significantly reduced effort levels.   
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Treatment RRL had the highest number of messages; however there are only three 
significant correlations. Individual effort is positively correlated with talk about previous 
rounds and positive talk about the group (categories 7 and 9) but is negatively correlated 
with  talk of luck or random  play (category 12).  Unlike in  FFL, the significant  positive 
correlation between positive talk about the group and effort is not likely the consequence of 
reverse causation (due to the random anonymous group matching each period) suggesting 
that messages that help build team spirit and team identity help groups reduce shirking to 
increase the group’s share of the CPR. In treatment FRNL only message category 13 (other 
miscellaneous messages) is significantly correlated to individual effort. 
 
5.3. Regression analysis 
While the Kendall Tau statistics did not show evidence of a correlation between the 
raw quantity of messages and individual effort, the relationship between messages and effort 
may change over the length of the experiment. To estimate this effect we test the linear 
regression model reported in Table 7 that interacts message volume with a trend variable. 
Significant interactions between the inverse period and message volume variables in the 
FFL and FRNL signify that message volume is negatively correlated with individual effort 
in the first period but positively correlated for all later periods. It is interesting to note that 
only for the RRL treatment, the correlation between message volume and effort is positively 
correlated and constant across all periods, likely due to the fact that for randomly reassigned 
output-sharing groups the first period is no different from any other. To investigate these 
treatment  effects  any  further requires  estimating  a regression model that focuses on the 
effects that messages from different categories have on individual effort. Table 8 reports the 
estimation results of a random effects panel model regressing individual effort levels on 
communication  message  categories  in  each  period  for  each  of  the  three  communication 
treatments. Estimation assumes random effects at the subject level to account for correlation 
among effort decisions made by each subject and uses robust standard errors to correct for 
possible  heteroskedasticity  across  subjects.  The  assumption  of  random-effects  at  the 
individual  level  fits  the  experimental  context  well,  for  any  subject-specific  effects  
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(individual  heterogeneity)  are  independent  of  changes  in  the  experimental  treatments 
(exogenous  regressors).  In  addition  to  the  message  category  variables  in  the  model  we 
include a trend variable and lagged variables for the total contributions of others in your 
group and total contributions of the others not in your group in the previous period. These 
lagged variables control for the outcome from the previous round (reverse causation), i.e. for 
the strategic responses to the actions of other subjects within and outside of someone’s 
group in the previous round. In this way the regression model allows the message category 
variables to possibly explain deviations from individual best responses. 
First we find that the constant in the model is not significantly different from the 
symmetric individual-level effort prediction summarized in Table 2 (16.99 vs. 19.5, 11.74 
vs. 13 and 11.41 vs. 13 for treatments FFL, RRL and FRNL, respectively). While the trend 
variable  is  not  significant  for  any  of  the  three  treatments,  the  remaining  independent 
variables explain the deviations of effort from the predicted levels. We find that the lagged 
variables controlling for the past contribution levels of others are only significant in the FFL 
treatment  in  which  communication  group  composition  was  fixed  and  was  linked  to  the 
output-sharing  group.  This  is  as  expected  since  the  other  treatments  both  involved 
randomized output-sharing group assignment each period so rational subjects would not be 
expected to respond to decisions made in previous groups. In the FFL treatment individual 
effort is positively related to the past contributions by others in your group but negatively 
related  to  past  contributions  made  by  others  outside  your  group.  This  suggests  that 
independent of the communication content, subjects match effort levels of those of their 
group members (consistent with tit-for-tat) in a likely effort to reach the cooperative group 
profit maximum, but respond by lowering contributions if other groups are raising their 
contributions. The latter is a best response strategy when groups are already contributing 
more than the socially efficient effort level, which is the case for the FFL treatment.  
In  terms  of  significant  communication  message  effects,  results  depend  on  the 
treatment.  In  the  FRNL  treatment  in  which  communication  groups  were  not  linked  to 
output-sharing groups, none of the message categories was found to be significant at a 5% 
level. This confirms the neutral effect of communication in social groups that do not directly 
share output with each other. In the RRL treatment, messages in categories 5 (agreement), 7  
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(previous  effort/profit),  8  (conflict/competition/coordination)  and  9  (positive  talk  about 
group) have a significantly positive effect on effort and messages in category 11 (talk about 
game rules) have a significantly negative effect on effort. This suggests that when group 
membership  is  randomized  every  period,  discussions  focusing  on  group  spirit  or  the 
coordination of effort based on logical considerations of the outcomes of previous rounds 
are most likely to successfully reduce shirking and achieve higher effort levels. Lastly, in 
the FFL treatment, effects of communication categories 3 (propose amount to invest) and 5 
(agreement) are significantly positive on effort and effects of communication category 2 
(ask for clarification) is significantly negative on effort. Positive talk about the group and 
discussion  of  coordination  efforts  in  previous  periods  is  far  less  effective  in  raising 
individual  effort  levels  than  making  proposals  that  are  not  challenged  or  debated  when 
groups  share  with  fixed  partners  for  the  length  of  the  experiment.  The  significant 
relationships  between  effort  and  communicating  proposals  and  clarifications  in  the  FFL 
treatment are consistent with the fact that fixed group membership allows for the building of 
trust (or mis-trust) over time with group members. In other words, subjects are not likely to 
respond to proposals by increasing effort (decreasing shirking) when they do not know or 
trust the subjects who they are grouped with and will likely not be grouped with again. The 
results, therefore, support the conjecture that positive talk about the group and messages 
involving team spirit are more helpful in increasing effort than simply making proposals 
when subjects are strangers. 
To  summarize  the  content  analysis  of  the  effect  of  communication  messages  on 
individual effort we now report consistent results found across all three analyses reported in 
Tables 6 through 8. First, when communication groups are not linked to output-sharing 
groups  (FRNL),  communication  has  no  effect  on  effort.  Second,  when  groups  are 
randomized  each  period  (RRL)  positive  talk  about  the  group  and  discussion  involving 
decisions and outcomes from previous periods are crucial to increasing effort levels. Lastly, 
when groups are fixed over time (FFL) messages asking for clarifications are associated 
with decreasing effort levels, while proposing an amount and agreements are associated 
with increasing effort levels. Our regression results also confirm that lagged total effort by  
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others in the groups and others outside the group significantly influence individual decision 
in the FFL treatment only.  
Our results indicate some interesting similarities and differences to the experiment in 
a tournament setting conducted by Sutter and Strassmair (2009). There are three crucial 
differences in the design of both experiments that can shed some light on the differences in 
results. First, we have a CPR game with an interior solution that brings payoffs to each 
member  of  a  team  directly  in  proportion  to  the  team’s  relative  effort  level.  There  are, 
therefore, no distinct winners and losers in our experiment, but each group’s effort level is 
directly linked to its payoff. Second, Sutter and Strassmair give more information to each 
individual subject. Subjects were informed about the effort level that each member of their 
own team chose, while we only supplied average effort and payoff information for the group 
and all other groups. Third, we have both a partner and stranger treatment, while Sutter and 
Strassmair  use  only  a  partner  treatment.  We  find  that  lagged  effort  decisions  are  only 
influential in current effort decisions for the partnered groups but not for stranger groups. 
We confirm Sutter and Strassmair’s observation that communication with people outside of 
your team does not affect individual effort behaviour, but in our case teams are strangers not 
partners when they communicate with people outside of their group. One would expect that 
strangers had a bit more of an incentive to influence others not in their groups through 
communication as one might be matched up with them later on in the experiment. We also 
found  that  groups  focused  on  very  different  communication  topics.  In  Sutter’s  and 
Strassmair’s experiment, groups were much more concerned about unequal efforts within 
their team and appeals to fairness. In none of our groups was equity a major discussion 
topic. This seems to suggest that communication contents and consequently behaviour are 
influenced  by  the  information  provided  to  subjects.  Cheap  talk  seems  ineffective  in 
overcoming shirking within groups with non-linked output-sharing, which is desirable in our 
case from a social perspective and from a group and individual perspective as it maximizes 
payoffs. This result is in contrast to tournaments and applications to effort provision in the 
firm, where the employer’s objective differs from the employee’s objective and the best 
interest of the group.  
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Communication  among  group  members  in  a  setting  in  which  multiple  groups 
compete with one another may not lead to optimal resource allocation. In particular, the 
success of introducing shirking incentives through output-sharing groups in a common pool 
resource  environment  may  not  be  maintained  when  communication  is  permitted  among 
group members. We have shown that groups manage to coordinate quite effectively through 
cheap talk and induce members to increase effort and therefore to avoid free-riding on the 
effort of others that is so apparent in output-sharing partnerships without communication.  
While  shirking  is  reduced  when  output-sharing  and  communication  groups  are  linked 
regardless of whether the output-sharing groups are fixed over time or randomly reassigned 
each production period, breaking the link between output sharing and communication has a 
remarkable impact on efficiency. If output-sharing groups are reassigned each period but 
communication  groups remain fixed over time,  shirking in  output-sharing  groups  is  not 
substantially  reduced  and  effort  remains  at  levels  comparable  to  the  no-communication 
treatments.  In  addition,  the  average  income  earned  system-wide  is  higher  and  more 
equitably distributed than when communication groups are linked. 
Our  online  chat  room  design  allows  us  to  further  explore  the  communication 
contents  in  different  treatments  and  therefore  to  analyze  the  impact  of  specific 
communication  contents  on  individual  effort  decisions.  Through  a  systematic  content 
analysis we find that the content of communication differs by the group allocation method 
and  by  whether  or  not  communication  groups  are  linked  to  output-sharing  groups.  The 
finding that high message volumes in fixed communication groups who shared output was 
correlated with lower effort levels suggests that in a multiple group environment such as this 
one,  once  a  group  has  coordinated  its  behavior,  it  does  not  require  frequent  repeated 
communication. This is unlike the communication pattern in the randomly formed output-
sharing groups, which suggests that more communication is needed in these settings for 
cooperative behavior to take hold. Because people were always reassigned to new output-
sharing groups, high chat volumes had to be maintained to reassure commitment to effort 
provision of partners.   
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This  paper reports on the effects  of  communication in  an environment in  which 
appropriators of a common pool resource share output with members of an exogenously 
formed group. While the evidence suggests best practices for carrying out an output-sharing 
policy, it also allows for unique insight into the effects of communication in a multiple 
group setting in  which  communication does  not  necessarily increase welfare. This  is  in 
contrast to the literature on the provision of public goods and extraction from common pool 
resources without between-group conflict which focuses on the role of communication in 
increasing overall welfare. Further research needs to explore the effect of permitting group 
members to communicate with members of other groups as well as their own group. When 
communication groups and output-sharing groups are linked and membership is fixed, will 
the ability of all participants to communicate with everyone in the CPR lead to increased 
shirking and convergence to the efficient level of effort? If unlinked communication and 
output-sharing groups have this same opportunity, will the high efficiency be maintained or 
will it collapse? 
In the environment we have presented, an outside agency establishes output-sharing 
groups as a means to manage the CPR. A further extension of this work could examine the 
role  of  communication  and  output  sharing  in  an  environment  with  endogenous  group 
formation or in an environment with communication in which the appropriators are able to 
design and implement the control mechanism. Resource users could, for example, either 
vote  on  the  optimal  size  of  output-sharing  groups  or  an  outside  mediator  could  simply 
suggest  the  optimal  group  size  (as  suggested  by  Heintzelman  et  al.,  2009).  Pre-play 
communication  furthermore  has  been  shown  to  induce  subjects  to  pursue  the  payoff-
dominant strategy (see for example Cooper at al., 1992) Will groups evolve that correct 
group size for the effects different communication environments create and will there be a 
role  for  randomly  assigned  output-sharing  groups  in  this  environment?  These  research 
questions are relevant not only in the area of the provision of public goods and harvesting 
resources from a common pool, but also for competition in oligopolistic markets and the 
efficient supply of effort by teams in large corporations.  
    





Figure 1.  Mean system effort allocated to appropriation from the common pool  




Figure 2.  Distribution of individual session payoffs by treatment 















30 35 40 45 50










Hundreds of Lab Dollars 
  27 
 
Figure 3.  Distribution of communication messages by treatment 
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Table 1.  Experimental Design 
 
Treatment  # of Sessions  Communication  Group 
Assignment 
R  4  No  Random 
F  4  No  Fixed 
RRL  4 
 




Random Communication Group 
Linked to Random Output Sharing 
Group 
FFL  4 
 




Fixed Communication Group 
Linked to 
Fixed Output Sharing Group 
FRNL  4 




Fixed Communication Group not 
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Notes: Standard deviations of the session means are in parentheses. The means and standard 
deviations are based upon four observations for each treatment. 
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Table 3. Mean individual cumulative payoffs and coefficients of variation of payoffs per 





F  R  FRNL  RRL  FFL 
Mean individual session payoff 
in lab dollars 
4174.26  4147.10  4137.98  3989.53  3528.27 
(21.67)  (33.99)  (42.90)  (61.51)  (123.95) 











Notes: Standard deviations of the session means are in parentheses. The means and standard 
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Table 4.  OLS regressions on coefficient of variation 
Treatment  Coefficient 
(robust standard errors) 
F  -0.04** 
(0.02) 
R  -0.08*** 
(0.01) 
FRNL  -0.10*** 
(0.01) 
RRL  -0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Constant  0.13*** 
(0.01) 
Observations  20 
R-squared  0.854 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses ; *** p ≤ 0.01, 
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Table 5.  Reliability indexes and frequency of message coding by treatments 
 






Code  Category Description  Kappa  Relative 
frequency 
Kappa  Relative 
frequency 
Kappa  Relative 
frequency 
C1  Initiating discussion  0.97 
 
6.14  0.93  6.67  0.81  1.05 
C2  Ask for / inquire / clarify 
proposals of other group 
members 
0.57  8.63  0.62  10.35  0.56  9.34 
C3  Propose an amount to 
invest into market 2 
0.79  21.40  0.72  32.40  0.76  29.41 
C4  Disagreement or doubts  0.33 
 
2.10  0.55  4.20  0.48  1.72 
C5  Agreement  0.84 
 
20.77  0.77  21.24  0.79  23.28 
C6  Talk about the relationship 
between investment 
decision and payment 
0.46  6.78  0.58  6.76  0.52  4.35 
C7  Talk about the investment 
decisions or payoffs made 
in the previous rounds 
0.80  26.80  0.63  10.77  0.62  16.28 
C8  Talk about the 
conflict/competition/ 
coordination 
0.51  7.61  0.52  7.61  0.60  12.81 
C9  Positive talk about the 
group (e.g., team work and 
group spirit, loyalty, 
honesty, equity) 
0.26  1.83  0.52  5.59  0.62  6.53 
C10  Negative talk about the 
group (e.g., distrust, 
dishonesty, defection) 
0.11  0.94  0.63  6.91  0.56  4.64 
C11  Talk about the game rules 
(e.g., conversion rate, 
grouping; what can be 
revealed in the chat) 
0.63  6.91  0.45  8.45  0.44  6.17 
C12  Talk about luck or play 
random 
0.75  2.05  0.57  0.70  0.87  1.14 
C13  Others (e.g., humor, time, 
comments) 
0.47  7.44  0.61  7.27  0.57  8.77 
C14  Noting last round  0.59 
 
0.75  0.83  0.45  0.55  0.86 
Notes: Messages coded as Category 2 do not specifically refer to a contribution level. For each category, 
the p-value is less than 0.005 for the relevant Kappa. These p-values are the probabilities of incorrectly 
rejecting the null hypothesis that coder agreement is no better than chance. 
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Table  6.    Kendall  Tau  Correlation  Coefficients:  Individual  Effort  versus  Number  of 
Messages (probability of making an error by rejecting null that coefficient is equal to 
zero) 
 
  Treatment 
Message Type  FFL  RRL  FRNL 












C2:Ask  for  /  inquire  /  clarify 







C3:Propose  an  amount  to  invest 



















C6:Talk  about  the  investment 







C7:Talk  about  the  investments  or 






















































Notes: Kendall Tau statistics that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level are 
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Table 7.  Effects of volume of messages on individual effort 
 
Dependent Variable: individual effort       
Independent Variables  FFL  RRL  FRNL 
       
Inverse period  0.35  -0.73  3.87** 
  (2.64)  (2.39)  (1.95) 
volume of messages  0.15***  0.14***  0.16*** 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
volume*inverse period  -0.27***  -0.08  -0.25** 
  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.10) 
Constant  17.86***  13.54***  12.28*** 
  (1.01)  (1.08)  (0.63) 
       
Observations  720  720  720 
Number of individual  48  48  48 
 
Notes:  Robust  standard errors  in  parentheses.  *** significant  at  1%, **  significant  at  5%,  * 
significant at10%. All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual subject 
effects. The volume of the message is the total messages that an individual sent and received from 
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Table 8.  Effects of various types of messages on individual efforts 
 
Dependent Variable: Individual effort       
Independent Variables  FFL  RRL  FRNL 
       
Inverse period  -2.82  -2.07  1.84 
  (2.55)  (3.23)  (2.21) 
Lagged period total contribution from others in your group  0.12***  -0.01  0.02 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Lagged period total contribution from others not in your group  -0.03**  0.01  0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
C1:Initiating discussion  1.74  0.42  0.13 
  (2.58)  (0.31)  (0.28) 
C2:Ask for / inquire / clarify proposals of other group members   -0.61***  -0.15  -0.07 
  (0.17)  (0.23)  (0.19) 
C3:Propose an amount to invest into market 2  0.22***  -0.08  0.19 
  (0.05)  (0.11)  (0.13) 
C4:Disagreement or doubts  -0.52  0.09  -0.34 
   (0.53)  (0.35)  (0.42) 
C5:Agreement  0.20**  0.32**  -0.03 
  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.10) 
C6:Talk about the investment decision and payment relationship  0.17  0.07  0.49 
  (0.27)  (0.32)  (0.36) 
C7:Talk about the investments or payoffs made previously   0.18  0.38**  0.02 
  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.10) 
C8:Talk about the conflict/competition/ coordination   -0.15  0.69***  -0.26 
  (0.14)  (0.25)  (0.26) 
C9: Positive talk about the group   -0.17  1.12***  0.28 
   (0.22)  (0.28)  (0.58) 
C10:Negative talk about the group   -0.19  0.29  0.48 
   (0.30)  (0.19)  (0.90) 
C11:Talk about the game rules   0.30*  -0.76***  0.23 
  (0.17)  (0.27)  (0.18) 
C12:Talk about luck or play random  -0.80  -0.53  0.64* 
  (0.53)  (0.92)  (0.38) 
C13:Others   -0.15  -0.39*  0.13 
  (0.16)  (0.21)  (0.19) 
C14:Noting last round  0.18  0.99  0.66 
  (0.69)  (0.98)  (0.60) 
Constant  16.99***  11.74***  11.41*** 
  (2.57)  (2.06)  (1.45) 
Observations  672  672  672 
Number of individuals  48  48  48 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at10%. 
All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual subject effects. Variables C1-C14 are 
the volume of group messages by coding categories, i.e., the total messages exchanged within a group that fall 
into a given category.     
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APPENDIX I 
 
1.  Equilibrium  for  CPR  Environment  when  Individuals  in  Groups  Attempt  to  Maximize 
Individual Profits when Output Sharing is Used as a Management Instrument 
 
 
Total output as a function of “effort” of all individuals using the CPR (X): 
 
Y = 32.5 X - 0.09375 X
2 
 
Individual Profit as a function of individual effort (x), the effort by members of the individual’s 
group (Xg) and the effort by all individuals using the CPR (X): 
 
∏ = 3.25(28 - x) + (1/n)(Xg/X)Y 
 
where n is the number of people in the individual’s group. If n = 1 then Xg = x. 
 
Differentiating ∏ with respect to x and setting this equal to zero yields 
 
-3.25 + (1/n)32.5 - (0.09375/n)(Xg +X) = 0 
 
This reduces to  
 
[(32.5 - 3.25n)/0.09375] = X + Xg 
 
There is an equation like this one for each member of each group. When the groups have more than 
one member, the equations for all of the members in any particular group are identical. This results 
in three unique equations of the form 
 
[(32.5 - 3.25n)/0.09375] = X + 
mXg where m is the group identifier. 
 
In the case of three four-person groups, there would be three equations with three unknowns, 
1Xg, 
2Xg, and 
3Xg. The solution will be 
 
mXg = [(32.5 - 3.25n)/0.09375]/[(12/n)+1] 
 
The  important  result  is  that  there  is  not  a  unique  equilibrium  quantity  for  the  individual.  The 
equilibrium condition requires that the sum of the contributions of the individuals in a group equal a 
unique value. There is a unique group Nash equilibrium allocation of effort to appropriation from the 
common pool.  
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2.  Equilibrium  for  CPR  Environment  when  Individuals  in  Groups  Attempt  to  Maximize 
Group Profits when Output Sharing is Used as a Management Instrument 
 
 
Individual Profit as a function of individual effort (x), the effort by members of the individual’s 
group (Xg) and the effort by all individuals using the CPR (X): 
 
∏ = 3.25(28 - x) + (1/n)(Xg/X)Y 
 
Profit for the group is 
 
Individual Profit as a function of individual effort (x), the effort by members of the individual’s 
group (Xg) and the effort by all individuals using the CPR (X): 
 
∏g = 3.25(28)n - 3.25Xg + 32.5Xg - 0.09375X Xg 
 
Differentiating ∏g with respect to Xg and setting this equal to zero yields 
 
Xg + X = 29.25/0.09375 
 





mXg = 312n/(12 + n) 
 
The Nash equilibria in the situations described above result in the following values 
 
Members  in 
Group 
(Number  of 
Groups) 
Group  Effort  with 
Individual 
Optimization 
System Effort with 
Individual 
Optimization 
Group  Effort  with 
Group 
Optimization 
System Effort with 
Group 
Optimization 
1 (12)  24  288  24  288 
2 (6)  39.6  237.7  44.6  267.4 
4 (3)  52  156  78  234 
6 (2)  46.2  92.4  104  208 
 
Note: The allocation of effort that will maximize system profits occurs when the system effort is 
156. This will be a Nash equilibrium if the group size is 4 and each group allocates 52 units of effort 
to appropriating from the common pool. The distribution of effort among group members is not 
unique. 
 
 
 
 
 